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COMPLIANCE AND CLAIM FUNDING: TESTING
THE BORDERS OF LAWYERS’ MONOPOLY AND
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Michele DeStefano*
INTRODUCTION
The complexity of commerce in today’s globalized era and the rise of
technology have sparked new developments in the debate surrounding
unauthorized practice of law (UPL) statutes. Proponents of UPL statutes
argue that these rules protect consumers from the incompetency of
nonlawyers.1 Opponents, however, argue that UPL statutes are designed to
protect lawyers’ monopoly2 on legal and law-related services,3 contending
that these statutes are written so broadly that the distinction between what is
legal advice versus nonlegal business or strategic advice is indeterminate.4
Further, these statutes seem to suggest that, as a profession, we have been
unable to define the practice of law in a concrete way. Thus, many argue
for the abolishment of UPL statutes. In doing so, opponents of UPL
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law (formerly known as Michele
DeStefano Beardslee). I thank Bruce Green, Erika Concetta Pagano, and the attendees and
participants of the Colloquium, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice of Law, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2563 (2014), for their advice, input, and comments on prior drafts. I also
thank Anna Vino for her research assistance. Lastly, it should be noted that given my
interest in and views about alternative litigation funding, I recently provided consultancy
services to a U.S. commercial claim funding company. The opinions and viewpoint in this
Article, however, are very much my own.
1. See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
2. I use the term “monopoly” as others have in this context. See, e.g., Deborah L.
Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of
Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 n.7 (1981) (“The term
‘monopoly’ is used throughout this article in a colloquial rather than legal sense. In
technical terms, the profession does not enjoy a monopoly in providing legal services; its
conduct in restricting entry and negotiating agreements with competing groups is that of a
trade association or cartel, rather than that of a monopolist.”).
3. Cf. Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice:
Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate,
84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1128–32 (2000); Christine Parker, Lawyer Deregulation via
Business Deregulation: Compliance Professionalism and Legal Professionalism, 6 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 175, 175 (1999) (“[G]eneral business deregulation is beginning to achieve a
partial loss of monopoly for corporate lawyers that was not accomplished by regulatory
reform aimed explicitly at the legal profession.”).
4. See Green, supra note 3, at 1143–44 (“As the conception of law practice expanded,
the distinction between legal services and other professional services became increasingly
blurry.”); cf. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business Out of Work Product,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1869, 1874–81 (2011) (contending that the reality of corporate practice
makes it impossible to distinguish between business and law).
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statutes believe that, amongst other benefits,5 access to justice will increase
because nonlawyers will be able to do what was traditionally lawyer-only
work, and lawyers will lose the power of a monopoly-rooted competitive
advantage. Proponents do not appear to disagree and, in fact, have been
accused of protecting UPL statutes for this very reason.6
Are the opponents to UPL statutes right? This is the primary issue I seek
to examine: will abolishing UPL laws enable nonlawyers to encroach on
lawyers’ monopoly of services?
Arguably, UPL statutes are most contentious on the margins—those
areas where the line between business and law is the hardest to draw.7
More and more lawyers are moving into these quasi-legal jobs, where a
legal license is not required but having a law degree provides an
advantage.8 As such, both lawyers and nonlawyers perform key roles and
often work together. Although there is debate over who should take the
lead, and many scholars have thoroughly studied the unauthorized practice
of law by nonlawyers,9 it does not appear that scholars or regulators have
focused on lawyers or nonlawyers working in these quasi-legal roles in
relation to UPL or the influence they might have on the reputation and
status of the legal profession.10
Thus, to fill this gap and analyze whether elimination of UPL restrictions
will decrease lawyers’ monopoly of legal and law-related services, I explore
5. For an argument that opening up the legal profession will increase opportunity for
innovation, see Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in
the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2794–95 (2012).
6. See infra Part I.C.
7. See Beardslee, supra note 4, at 1874–81 (describing the illusive distinction between
business and legal advice); Michele DeStefano Beardslee, The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: Third-Rate Doctrine for Third-Party Consultants, 62 SMU L. REV. 727, 751–55
(2009) (same).
8. See Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First Century Legal Profession,
63 DUKE L.J. 1243, 1259–60 (2014); see also NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW P LACEMENT,
EMPLOYMENT FOR THE CLASS OF 2011—SELECTED FINDINGS 2–3 (2012), available at
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2011SelectedFindings.pdf [hereinafter 2011 NALP
SELECTED FINDINGS]; see also NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, CLASS OF 2011 NATIONAL
SUMMARY REPORT (2012), available at http://www.nalp.org/uploads/NatlSummChart_
Classof2011.pdf [hereinafter 2011 NALP SUMMARY REPORT]. According to a NALP Press
Release, the percentage of jobs in business in 2010 increased to 18.1 percent, compared to
prior years reporting 10 to 14 percent. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Law
School Grads Face Worst Job Market Yet—Less Than Half Find Jobs in Private Practice
(June 7, 2012), available at http://www.nalp.org/uploads/PressReleases/Classof2011ERSS
SelectedFindingsPressRelease.pdf. The press release further states, “About 29% of these
jobs [in business] were reported as requiring bar passage, and about 37% were reported as
jobs for which a JD was an advantage.” Id.
9. See, e.g., UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE DECISIONS (George E. Brand ed., 1937);
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK (Justine Fischer & Dorothy H. Lachmann eds., 1972);
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 824–49 (1986); Thomas R. Andrews,
Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the
Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1989) (tracing the history of UPL prohibitions and the bar’s
policing of UPL); Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good
Fences Really Make Good Neighbors—or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
159; Rhode, supra note 2.
10. See Remus, supra note 8, at 1245–46.
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two growing areas straddling the border between business and law in which
lawyers and nonlawyers compete for jobs: compliance and claim funding
(also commonly known as alternative litigation funding).11 To aid in this
exploration, I use: (1) information from interviews I conducted with
seventy general counsels and compliance officers of S&P 500 corporations
across a variety of industries, including banking, pharmaceutical, and
petroleum (the Compliance Study);12 and (2) my own personal work
experience as a consultant to a start-up commercial claim funding company.
This set of data and my experience bring to life how some compliance
officers, lawyers, and commercial claim funders view and describe their
jobs, and, ultimately, aid my analysis of the effect that eliminating UPL
statutes may have on lawyers’ monopoly of law-related services.
My analysis leads me to three conclusions. First, the work conducted by
compliance officers and claim funders could be considered the practice of
law,13 and therefore, UPL statutes could prohibit such work if conducted by
nonlawyers. Second, often the people with legal training and practice
experience play the role of compliance officers and claim funders. Third,
because of their degrees, training, and experience, attorneys may be
considered more qualified or better situated to fill these mixed business-law
consultant roles than their nonlawyer counterparts.
If these conclusions are correct, they lead me to two preliminary
hypotheses. First, contrary to the arguments made in support of abolishing
UPL statutes, such a move may not end lawyers’ monopoly of legal and
law-related services. Instead, lawyers (those trained in the law) may be able
to monopolize (or at least maintain a stronghold in) the marketplace for
these closely law-related services, even if UPL statutes are eliminated. The
role of the corporate attorney has expanded as clients’ needs have grown
more complex. Clients may prefer that their lawyers fill these law-related
roles for two reasons: first, because they have played them historically, and
second, because they have the expertise and training to play them well.

11. Claim funding is often referred to as alternative litigation funding, litigation funding,
third-party funding, and litigation finance. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20,
WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE 6 (2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111019_draft_al
f_white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf. This Article will use the term claim funding for
the reasons described in an earlier article. See DeStefano, supra note 5, at 2796 n.22.
12. Included in this Article are interviews with some former general counsels, a chief
ethics officer, a former chair of the Association of Corporate Counsel’s Compliance and
Ethics Committee, and a former member of the SEC. For a full description of the interviews
and methodology, see Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71 app. (2014).
13. Admittedly, this is a difficult claim to make because, as suggested earlier, these
industries are on the line between business and law, and that distinction itself is almost
impossible to discern. But as is discussed infra, the activities conducted by claimholders and
compliance officers are often the same types of activities that lawyers do and that have
historically been categorized as legal services.
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Moreover, although law is arguably a business,14 lawyers are still part of a
profession, a delineation that only serves to protect the monopoly. 15
Second, these lawyer-nonlawyers may add to what Tanina Rostain
identified a few years ago as a growing industry of law consultants, who are
not necessarily part of the legal profession, and, therefore, not held to the
rules governing professional conduct.16 Because ambiguity surrounds
lawyers’ work in these quasi-legal areas and the issue of what is the practice
of law is also nebulous, lawyers in consultant positions may be able to
evade ethical obligations and help clients find legal loopholes because of
their training and expertise as lawyers.17 This raises special concerns for
the public and for the legal profession in terms of its reputation and position
in the marketplace.
Granted, I examine only two areas that lay on the margins of law and
business. More research needs to be done on other areas to determine if
these hypotheses have merit elsewhere.
Part I begins by providing a brief overview of the debate over UPL
statutes and the theory behind lawyers’ monopoly of legal services. Part II
describes and explores the type of work that compliance officers and
litigation funders conduct. It analyzes whether these law-related jobs could
be considered law practice and what skills and expertise are needed to fill
these roles. Part III attempts to answer the question posed above: Will
eliminating UPL statues potentially enable nonlawyers to fill the role that
lawyers currently play in these areas on the border between business and
law? In other words, if UPL laws were abolished, would a nonlawyer or
lawyer get the job? My analysis leads to the hypothesis that in the areas of
compliance and litigation funding, the lawyer will still get the job. Further,
collaboration may not increase between lawyers and nonlawyers, and
negative unintended consequences may result from abolishing UPL statues.
I. BACKGROUND: UPL AND LAWYERS’ MONOPOLY
The following Part begins by discussing the history behind UPL
prohibitions. It then briefly outlines the arguments for and against UPL
prohibitions and the theory behind lawyers’ monopolization of legal
services.

14. Beardslee, supra note 4, at 1874–90.
15. For these reasons, consumers may continue to hire lawyers over nonlawyers to
perform these roles, and access to cheaper, affordable legal services may not increase in
some areas if UPL prohibitions did not exist.
16. Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397,
1399 (2006) (discussing the emerging industry of “law consultants” and considering the
“effects law consulting might have on the interests and values that professional regulation is
intended to protect”).
17. See Remus, supra note 8, at 1246 (making a similar point and explaining that “[t]his
ambiguity creates opportunities for abuse by individual lawyers who seek to evade ethical
obligations, and for ethical arbitrage by sophisticated corporate clients who seek to access
legal expertise without the strictures of professional regulation”).
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A. UPL Prohibitions: Brief History and Status
Research indicates that some states had UPL laws as early as the middle
of the 1800s.18 In 1914, there were bar committees on unauthorized
practice19 and, by the 1920s, growing state interest and a series of cases
concerning UPL.20 The movement against UPL began in the 1930s21 when
the American Bar Association (ABA) created its first committee on UPL.22
State and local bar associations followed suit.23 The touted impetus behind
UPL prohibitions was to protect the public24 from nonlawyers who might
be offering illegitimate services purely for commercial gain.25 But as will
be discussed further below, the truth behind this purported impetus is not
certain.26
Some scholars have described enforcement of UPL prohibitions as
“episodic.”27 Evidently, enforcement reached an all-time high in the 1950s
and 1960s,28 and a “significant enforcement threat” persisted in the 1980s.29
18. Christensen, supra note 9, at 159–201. In a comprehensive study of the UPL
movement published in 1980, Barlow Christensen found that five states had unauthorized
practice legislation purportedly dating back to the mid-1800s, and another seventeen states
had legislation dating from 1870 to 1920. Id. at 180 & nn.113, 114 & 117.
19. Andrews, supra note 9, at 582 (“One of the first initiatives in this direction was
taken by the New York County Lawyers’ Association as early as 1914, when it established a
committee to combat the unauthorized practice of law.”); Christensen, supra note 9, at 189.
20. Rhode, supra note 2, at 6–8; see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 323 (1950); Christensen, supra note 9, at 161–90
(tracing the origin of UPL Laws regulating nonlawyers and substandard lawyers).
21. See sources cited supra note 20.
22. See Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of the A.B.A., 55 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 1, 94 (1930).
23. Andrews, supra note 9, at 582 (“By 1940, approximately 400 state and local bar
associations had similar committees.”); id. at 583 (explaining that the committee was
disbanded in 1984); Christensen, supra note 9; Edwin M. Otterbourg, Collection Agency
Activities: The Problem from the Standpoint of the Bar, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 35
(1938); Rhode, supra note 2, at 8, 10 (“Between 1930 and 1960, [special interest] journals
published some 358 articles on unauthorized practice.”).
24. Report of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 66 ANN.
REP. A.B.A. 260, 268 (1941) (“The public, far more than the lawyers, suffers injury from
unauthorized practice of law. The fight to stop it is the public’s fight.”).
25. Id.; A. Richard Immel, Crossing the Bar: Attorneys Try To Stop Do-It-Yourself
Trend in Some Areas of Law, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1976, at 1 (citing Frederick Buesser,
former chairman of the ABA Unauthorized Practice Committee, as claiming that the bar has
a “duty to see to it that people are protected from charlatans” such as those “out to make a
fast buck”); see also Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of the A.B.A., supra note
22, at 94 (explaining that the Committee on Unauthorized Practice was established to
“consider what action can be taken to protect the public against such improper practice”);
Report of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, supra note 24, at
268.
26. Rhode, supra note 2, at 9; see discussion infra Part I.C.
27. See Andrews, supra note 9, at 580 n.19; Christensen, supra note 9, at 175–201;
George W. C. McCarter, The ABA’s Attack on “Unauthorized” Practice of Law and
Consumer Choice, ENGAGE, May 2003, at 131, 132 (explaining that one of the two problems
that the ABA cited is the “‘spotty enforcement of unauthorized practice of law statutes
across the nation’” (quoting ALFRED P. CARLTON, JR., AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL DEFINITION OF
THE PRACTICE OF LAW CHALLENGE STATEMENT (2002))).
28. See Andrews, supra note 9, at 580 n.19.
29. See id. (explaining that there were sufficient business cases to make this true).
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Today, although varied, many states maintain statutes that criminalize
UPL.30 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 prohibits the unauthorized
practice of law31 and prohibits lawyers from assisting others in the
unauthorized practice of law.32
B. UPL Prohibitions: Definitions
In order to prohibit nonlawyers from practicing law, defining the practice
of law would be helpful as an initial matter.33 However, this has proven to
be an elusive task, arguably in part because the definition of law practice
has always included (and lawyers have always provided) professional
services in addition to those easily categorized as legal services, like
“giving an opinion as to the right to maintain an action against another,” or
“soliciting, settling, or adjusting personal injury claims,”34 or litigating and
representing clients at court hearings.35 In 1879, the U.S. Supreme Court
provided this definition: “Persons acting professionally in legal formalities,
negotiations, or proceedings by the warrant or authority of their clients may
be regarded as attorneys-at-law within the meaning of that designation as
used in this country.”36 As early as the mid-1930s, courts openly admitted
their reluctance “to adopt an all-inclusive definition of the term ‘practice of

30. McCarter, supra note 27, at 131. Providing a comprehensive survey of state UPL
statutes is beyond the scope of this Article. The ABA has put together a list of state
definitions of the practice of law. See TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE
PRACTICE OF LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT app. A, available at http://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/model-def/model_def_statutes.authcheckdam.pdf.
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2013).
32. Id.; Rhode, supra note 2, at 5 (explaining the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
as they were written in 1981).
33. See Or. State Bar v. Sec. Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334 (Or. 1962) (making a similar
point and explaining that the legislature had not provided a definition, preferring to “mark
out at least enough of the boundaries of the practice of law so that we can decide whether or
not the activities complained of fall within them, leaving to future cases such other
definitional problems as may remain unresolved”).
34. People ex rel. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Goodman, 8 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ill. 1937) (citing
Fitchette v. Taylor, 254 N.W. 910 (Minn. 1934)). Also included in this list was “[t]he
procuring of an agreement enabling an unlicensed person to control the negotiations and the
litigation that might follow on the failure of the negotiations, and the hiring of licensed
attorneys to conduct litigation for others, for the financial profit of the hirer.” Id. (citing
Howe v. State Bar of Cal., 298 P. 25 (Cal. 1931); Smallberg v. State Bar of Cal., 297 P. 916
(Cal. 1931); Shaw v. State Bar of Cal., 297 P. 532 (Cal. 1931); Hightower v. Detroit Edison
Co., 247 N.W. 97 (Mich. 1933); In re Otterness, 232 N.W. 318 (Minn. 1930)). For cases
with similar holdings, see Berk v. State, 142 So. 832 (Ala. 1932); Creditors’ Nat’l Clearing
House, Inc. v. Bannwart, 116 N.E. 886 (Mass. 1917); In re Coop. Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 32
(N.Y. 1910).
35. In re Duncan, 65 S.E. 210, 211 (S.C. 1909) (“It is too obvious for discussion that the
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in courts. According to the generally
understood definition of the practice of law in this country, it embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, and the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and, in
addition, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and, in general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney at law is one who engages in any of these branches of the practice of law.”).
36. Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199 (1879).
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law.’”37 Today, courts still lament: “It is often difficult, if not impossible,
to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of
law.”38 Thus, historically, the practice of law has consistently been defined
very broadly.39 In the 2000s, a common definition stated that the practice

37. Goodman, 8 N.E.2d at 944.
38. Ark. Bar Ass’n v. Block, 323 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ark. 1959) (“Each case must be
decided upon its own particular facts.—The practice of law is difficult to define. Perhaps it
does not admit of exact definition.”), modified by Creekmore v. Izard, 367 S.W.2d 419 (Ark.
1963); Fought & Co., Inc. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 951 P.2d 487, 495–96 (Haw.
1998) (explaining that the court has never formally defined the practice of law); People ex
rel. Ill. State Bar Ass’n v. Schafer, 87 N.E.2d 773, 776 (Ill. 1949) (same); Sudzus v. Dep’t of
Emp’t Sec., 914 N.E.2d 208, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (applying the definition quoted infra
note 39 that the Illinois Supreme Court provided in 1931); Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v.
Mangan, 763 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Me. 2001) (recognizing that the court has never formally
defined the practice of law); State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 648 (N.D. 1986) (“[W]hat
constitutes the practice of law does not lend itself to an inclusive definition.”).
39. For example, in the 1930s, the following represented a common definition of the
practice of law:
[T]he practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation, but also services rendered out of court. In litigated matters it involves
not only the actual representation of the client in court, but also services rendered
in advising a client as to his cause of action or defense. The practice of law also
includes the giving of advice or rendering services requiring the use of legal skill
or knowledge.
People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 176 N.E. 901, 907
(Ill. 1931); see also State Bar Ass’n of Conn. v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 140 A.2d 863, 870
(Conn. 1958) (“The practice of law consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces the giving
of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation of legal instruments
covering an extensive field.”); Del. State Bar Ass’n v. Alexander, 386 A.2d 652, 661 (Del.
1978) (“The practice of law includes ‘all advice to clients, and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law’ . . . and the exercise of such professional skill certainly
includes the pursuit, as an advocate for another, of a legal remedy within the jurisdiction of a
quasi judicial tribunal.” (quoting In re Welch, 185 A.2d 458, 459 (Vt. 1962))); Goodman, 8
N.E.2d at 944. Some courts attempt to put parameters around the vagueness (i.e., by asking
whether the public interest is served or not). See Iowa Supreme Court Comm’n on
Unauthorized Practice of Law v. Sturgeon, 635 N.W.2d 679, 682–81 (Iowa 2001)
(specifying that it is the professional judgment of the lawyer that matters); In re Op. 33 of
Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 733 A.2d 478 (N.J. 1999); see also COLO. R. CIV.
P. 201.3(2); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 35.1; Denver Bar Ass’n v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 391 P.2d 467,
471 (Colo. 1964) (“We believe that generally one who acts in a representative capacity in
protecting, enforcing, or defending the legal rights and duties of another and in counseling,
advising and assisting him in connection with these rights and duties is engaged in the
practice of law.”); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Baker,
492 N.W.2d 695, 701 (Iowa 1992) (refraining from providing a single, all-inclusive
definition of the practice of law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c (1998); TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF
LAW, supra note 30. Some courts delineate exceptions (i.e., the authorization of law
students to represent indigent clients as part of a law school clinic and representation by
laypersons in certain administrative agency proceedings). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c; see, e.g., KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.020 (providing an
exception for “[a]n appearance in the small claims division of the district court by a person
who is an officer of or who is regularly employed in a managerial capacity by a corporation
or partnership which is a party to the litigation in which the appearance is made”).
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of law was “legal knowledge or skill” as opposed to merely “simple, factbased answers”40 like “the filling in of blanks in legal instruments.”41
Recently, the ABA created a task force to determine whether it should
create a model definition of UPL that “would support the goal to provide
the public with better access to legal services, be in concert with
governmental concerns about anticompetitive restraints, and provide a basis
for effective enforcement of unauthorized practice of law statutes.”42 The
ABA adopted the model definition proposed by the committee and
recommended that each state and territory adopt a definition that “should
include the basic premise that the practice of law is the application of legal
principles and judgment to the circumstances or objectives of another
person or entity.”43

40. Sudzus, 914 N.E.2d at 217–18 (finding that a nonlawyer’s appearance at the
administrative hearing was not the unauthorized practice of law); see also King v. First
Capital Fin. Servs. Corp., 828 N.E.2d 1155, 1168 (Ill. 2005); In re Discipio, 645 N.E.2d 906,
910 (Ill. 1994); Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 771, 774 (Ill. 1966);
Miller v. Vance, 463 N.E.2d 250, 251 (Ind. 1984) (“This Court has not attempted to provide
a comprehensive definition of what constitutes the practice of law because of the infinite
variety of fact situations which must each be judged according to its own specific
circumstances.”); State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 23 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Neb. 1946).
41. King, 828 N.E.2d at 1162; Vance, 463 N.E.2d at 251. Providing a list of activities or
professional services that courts have held are or are not the unauthorized practice of law
(like the filling out of forms or charging a fee) is outside the scope of this Article. For a
nonexhaustive list, see Dressel v. Ameribank, 664 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Mich. 2003)
(“Charging a fee for nonlegal services does not transmogrify those services into the practice
of law.”). See also King, 828 N.E.2d at 1162 (citing Goodman, 8 N.E.2d at 944–45; People
v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 176 N.E. 901, 907 (Ill. 1931)); Kennedy v. Bar Ass’n,
561 A.2d 200, 208 (Md. 1989) (holding that the practice of law includes the using of “legal
education, training, and experience” to apply legal analysis to a client’s problems); In re
Jackman, 761 A.2d 1103, 1106 (N.J. 2000) (“One is engaged in the practice of law whenever
legal knowledge, training, skill, and ability are required.”).
42. ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, Model Definition of
the Practice of Law, Challenge Statement, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/task_force_model_definition_practice_law/model_definition_cha
llenge.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
43. STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENT PROT., TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF
THE PRACTICE OF LAW, RECOMMENDATIONS AS ADOPTED ON AUG. 11, 2003, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/model-def/recomm.
authcheckdam.pdf. In a prior recommendation, the Task Force defined the “practice of law”
as “the application of legal principles and judgment with regard to the circumstances or
objectives of a person” that require the knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law.”
See Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, Definition of the
Practice of Law Draft (9/18/02), A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/task_force_model_definition_practice_law/model_definition_definition.html
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (explaining that a person is presumed to be practicing law when
they are, among other conduct, “[g]iving advice or counsel to persons as to their legal rights
or responsibilities or to those of others”); see also McCarter, supra note 27, at 131 (making
the point that it is unclear what “trained in the law” means, but that it might mean only a
juris doctor degree).
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C. The Debate over UPL Prohibitions and Lawyers’ Monopoly
There is continued debate over prohibitions against UPL. Those in favor
of UPL prohibitions argue that they protect the public from bad legal advice
and representation and from inferior legal or law-related services.44 They
contend, “The chief reason for defining the practice of law and regulating
those who perform services within the scope of the definition is to protect
the public from harm that may result from the activities of dishonest,
unethical and incompetent providers.”45 As one court explained:
In modern times the affairs of the people requiring the services of a
lawyer have become more intricate and complex, demanding a
corresponding increase in the standards of the profession through
preliminary education and a lengthened and more diversified course of
study by those who would engage in the practice. Administrative law,
although of comparatively recent growth, is recognized today as an
important branch of the law. Classes for the study thereof are now taught
in many of our leading law schools. Relatively speaking, not many years
ago that part of a legal education was unknown to the curriculums of law
colleges. In addition to the rigid educational requirements, the applicant
must possess a good moral character. These prerequisites are not for the
purpose of creating a monopoly in the legal profession nor for its
protection, but are for the better security of the people against
incompetency and dishonesty.46

Further, proponents explain that because of information asymmetry,
consumers cannot evaluate the quality of legal services. Requiring that

44. See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and
the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal
Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 92 (2000) (“The stated
purpose of the unauthorized-practice-of-law rules is to protect the public. The theory is that
a non-lawyer delivering legal services will make errors in legal work that a lawyer would not
make, and will thereby harm the consumer of the legal services.”); see also DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 83 (2004); J. Howard Beales, III, The Economics of Regulating
the Professions, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 125, 127 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen
Rubin eds., 1980) (contending that regulatory protection may be needed because of market
imperfections and because the risk of low-quality services are quite high); Derek A.
Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and
Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2593–97 (1999).
45. TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, supra note 30,
at 5, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/model-def/
taskforce_rpt_803.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Denckla, supra note 44, at 2581, 2593–94
(discussing the legal monopoly and how the Model Code of Professional Responsibility’s
Ethical Considerations justify prohibiting UPL).
46. Goodman, 8 N.E.2d at 944 (citing In re Op. of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313 (Mass.
1935); People v. Alfani, 125 N.E. 671 (N.Y. 1919)); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence
of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1988) (“These freedoms are usually analyzed as part of
a social bargain: they are public privileges awarded in exchange for public benefits.
Lawyers are given a monopoly over certain kinds of work. . . . They enjoy the social
prestige of ‘professional’ status. In return, supposedly, the bar regulates its members to
ensure that lawyers will not only represent clients competently and faithfully but also uphold
the law.”); Susan Poser, Multijurisdictional Practice for a Multijurisdictional Profession, 81
NEB. L. REV. 1379, 1385 (2003) (“UPL laws help to protect the public from charlatans,
incompetents, and over-eager, first-year law students.”).
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legal services be provided solely by lawyers solves this inequality.47
Attorneys, as opposed to nonlawyers, must attain a certain level of
education and training at an accredited law school, and must have passed
the bar and character and fitness requirements.48 They also need to pass the
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) and follow the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Nonlawyers, on the other hand, are
not subject to the same regulatory and ethical restraints and, therefore, may
be tempted to cut corners or may deliberately or accidentally conduct
fraud.49 This view is based on the notion that the legal profession is not a
business, but a profession—meaning its purpose is, at least in part, for the
public benefit rather than solely for lawyers’ profit.50
Those opposed to UPL statutes often argue that, instead of protecting
consumers, UPL statutes protect lawyers from competition with nonlaywers
for law and law-related services.51 They contend, as Judge Richard Posner
47. Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of
the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 436, 437–38
(2001) (“[T]he most common defense of lawyer regulation—protection of the public from
incompetents—depends upon two separate claims: information asymmetry . . . and [that]
incompetent lawyers could cause substantial harm . . . .”).
48. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013) (providing for duties of
diligence, confidentiality, and avoiding of conflicts of interest).
49. In re Mid-Am. Living Trust Assocs., 927 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Mo. 1996) (contending
that there are at least three harmful effects to consumers stemming from nonlawyer legal
service providers); A. Jay Cristol, The Nonlawyer Provider of Bankruptcy Legal Services:
Angel or Vulture?, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 353, 357 (1994) (labeling nonlawyers as
“vulture” service providers who “sell their services to the financially distressed, and often
cause harm to the debtor”); see, e.g., Quintin Johnstone, Unauthorized Practice of Law and
the Power of State Courts: Difficult Problems and Their Resolution, 39 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 795, 799 (2003) (“One difference between lawyers and nonlawyers as legal services
providers is that, collectively, lawyers as a profession provide all kinds of legal services and
in all fields of law, whereas each of the nonlawyer professions and occupations, except
paralegals, most always operate in more limited legal service spheres.”).
50. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and the Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1229, 1231 (1995). According to Russell Pearce, “While esoteric knowledge made the
bargain necessary, lawyers’ altruism made the bargain acceptable. In contrast to
businesspersons, who maximized financial self-interest, altruistic lawyers placed the
interests of the common good and their clients above their own financial and other selfinterests.” Id. at 1239; cf. CHRISTINE PARKER, JUST LAWYERS: REGULATION AND ACCESS TO
JUSTICE 20 (1999) (“Bad service from lawyers is not just another consumer issue, it makes
people feel they have been denied justice.”); Christopher Curran, The American Experience
with Self-Regulation in the Medical and Legal Professions, in REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS:
A LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH TO THE REGULATION OF ATTORNEYS AND PHYSICIANS IN
THE US, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, GERMANY AND THE UK 50–51 (Michael Faure et al.
eds., 1993).
51. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 241–43, 246–47
(1988) (“By restricting the practice of law to members of the bar, of course, a professional
monopoly is guaranteed and a higher-than-otherwise level of lawyers’ fees is maintained.”);
Kathleen Eleanor Justice, There Goes the Monopoly: The California Proposal To Allow
Nonlawyers To Practice Law, 44 VAND. L. REV. 179, 187–90 (1991); id. at 180 (“The legal
profession consistently has fought outside competition and successfully has controlled
competition to ensure professional survival. . . . State statutes and bar association
regulations forbid the practice of law by nonlawyers.”); cf. Parker, supra note 3, at 175
(“[G]eneral business deregulation is beginning to achieve a partial loss of monopoly for
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has, that the legal profession is “‘a cartel of providers of services relating to
society’s laws’ and that restricting entry is the focus of that cartel.”52
Others analogize it to rent seeking, wherein “skilled crafts and professions
have tried to raise their members’ incomes by using the power of the state
to limit entry.”53 They question what UPL statutes try to protect. Are they
trying to protect consumers “[f]rom inept charlatans masquerading as
experienced practitioners[, which] is what the ABA would have us
assume[?] But what about protection from an exclusive trade guild licensed
to charge monopoly prices for even routine clerical services?”54
These commentators argue that UPL definitions, like the one recently
recommended by the ABA, “stymie much-needed efforts to increase
accessibility to our civil justice system through the expansion of such
nonlawyer services.”55 As one commentator argues,
Rather than protecting the public, unauthorized-practice rules have been
systematically abused to curtail consumers’ options to choose legal
services that meet their needs and budgets. As a result, according to a
1996 ABA study, some 38 million low- and moderate-income Americans
are closed out of our civil justice system because they simply cannot
afford to hire a lawyer to help them. 56

Some think that opening up the law market will enable nonlawyers to
provide services currently only legally provided by lawyers.57 Subscribers
to this view contend that “lawyers cannot fully serve the legal needs of the
public, and nonlawyer legal providers are here to stay.”58 They argue,
therefore, that “[i]t is time to come into the 21st century and repudiate
protectionist practices that hurt consumers and justifiably engender disdain
corporate lawyers that was not accomplished by regulatory reform aimed explicitly at the
legal profession.”). See generally Green, supra note 3, at 1128–32; Rhode, supra note 2, at 9.
52. McCarter, supra note 27, at 131; James C. Turner, Lawyer vs. Nonlawyer: ABA
Chose Wrong Side in Drafting ‘Unauthorized Practice’ Rule, LEGAL TIMES (Feb. 3, 2003),
http://www.turnerhome.org/jct/Clips/turner-legal-times-02-03-03.pdf (“There is a long
history of state bar associations misusing unauthorized practice restrictions to attack
perceived economic threats to lawyer dominance over the delivery of legal services.”).
53. McCarter, supra note 27, at 131.
54. Id. at 132.
55. Turner, supra note 52; see, e.g., RHODE, supra note 44, at 79–102; Ralph C.
Cavanagh & Deborah L. Rhode, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An
Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976); Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal
Services by Nonlawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209 (1990) [hereinafter Rhode, Delivery];
Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer
Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701 (1996) [hereinafter Rhode, Professionalism
in Perspective].
56. Turner, supra note 52.
57. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 44, at 79–102; Cavanagh & Rhode, supra note 55;
Rhode, Delivery, supra note 55; Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective, supra note 55.
58. Turner supra note 52; ABA Task Force, HALT, http://www.halt.org/what-we-do-foryou/improve-legal-access/unauthorized-practice-of-law/aba-task-force (last visited Apr. 26,
2014) (“The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice also testified,
indicating that the proposal raised antitrust concerns. Many legal service providers,
including legal publishers and paralegals, testified at the hearing about the adverse effect that
the proposed definition would have on their businesses and, by extension, on their
customers’ access to legal services.”).
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for the legal profession.”59 In keeping with that view, the public has
consistently resisted UPL prohibitions since the 1960s, instead seeking less
expensive alternatives that it believes are just as good.60
Moreover, opponents contend that UPL statutes are written so broadly
that the distinction between legal advice versus nonlegal business or
strategic advice is indeterminate.61 As the needs of clients became more
complicated in the 1980s and 1990s, the role of attorneys changed and the
conception of the scope of legal practice broadened. As Bruce Green
explains, this conception “swept far beyond the traditional notion that
lawyers’ work centers primarily on representing clients in court and giving
advice about legal causes of action and drafting certain legal documents.”62
Lawyers began competing with nonlawyers for what might be described as
ancillary legal services, like accounting, tax, financial planning, mediation,
labor relations, mergers and acquisitions, real estate consultancy, and
insurance consultancy.63 The broadness of the definitions adopted by state
bar associations and courts would arguably cover some, if not all, of these
ancillary services.
Opponents to UPL statutes also contend that UPL legislation “prohibited
nonlawyers from combining with lawyers to offer the lawyer’s services for
profit.”64 This is because disciplinary rules against multidisciplinary
partnerships and sharing fees with nonlawyers must also be considered in
59. Turner, supra note 52.
60. See, e.g., BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 231 (1977) (citing
a 1974 ABA study in which 82 percent of respondents agreed that “[t]here are many things
that lawyers handle—for example, tax matters or estate planning—that can be done as well
and less expensively by nonlawyers—like tax accountants, trust officers of banks and
insurance agents”); Rhode, supra note 2, at 3–4 (observing the growth of “self-help” and
“do-it-yourself” legal publications and organizations in the 1980s); Bennett H. Beach, Those
Sue-It-Yourself Manuals, TIME, Dec. 8, 1980, at 112 (reporting that about fifty publishers
provide legal self-help manuals); see also Rhode, supra note 2, at 39–40 (surveying state
administrative agencies and state authorities in charge of policing UPL and finding that most
UPL complaints were about lawyer—and not nonlawyer—misconduct). Of course, in
addition to UPL prosecution, consumers have other tools by which to attack nonlawyer
misconduct, such as by civil actions for false advertising and other state consumer protection
statutes. Deborah J. Cantrell, The Obligation of Legal Aid Lawyers To Champion Practice by
Nonlawyers, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 893–94 (2004) (explaining that UPL sanctions are
fairly weak, the harshest being a misdemeanor conviction and that they do not generally
include damages or attorney’s fees as do many states’ consumer protection statutes).
61. Cf. Beardslee, supra note 4, at 1874–82 (contending that the reality of corporate
practice makes it impossible to distinguish between business and law); Green, supra note 3,
at 1143–44 (“As the conception of law practice expanded, the distinction between legal
services and other professional services became increasingly blurry.”).
62. Cf. Green, supra note 3, at 1143–44.
63. Id. at 1149; cf. Beardslee, supra note 4, at 1874–82 (contending that the reality of
corporate practice makes it impossible to distinguish between business and law); N.Y. State
Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 206 (1971), available at http://old.nysba.org/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&Content
ID=48584 (explaining that the following occupations constitute the practice of law when
conducted by a lawyer: “accountant, collection agency, claims adjuster, labor relations
consultant, business consultant, insurance agent, marriage counselor, real estate broker,
income tax service, [or] loan or mortgage broker”).
64. Andrews, supra note 9, at 580.
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the debate over UPL, as they run “parallel.”65 Like UPL prohibitions,
although they may be motivated partially by legitimate concerns for
consumers,66 these restrictive model rules apparently were developed in
order to protect lawyers’ monopoly by preventing competition by
nonlawyers.67 The defense for such restrictions was the threat of UPL. For
example, in 1984, the New York State Bar prevented a lawyer from
forming a professional relationship with a nonlawyer accountant because
the lawyer would “be enabling the accountant to hold himself out to his
clients as offering legal services through the affiliated lawyer.”68 In other
words, the justification for forbidding the collaboration, like that used to
justify UPL statutes, was to protect consumers who would erroneously
believe that a nonlawyer was providing legal assistance when, in fact, the
nonlawyer was not.69
Thus, the theory behind UPL and other restrictions on collaboration is
essentially the same: that lawyers are better than nonlawyers at providing
legal and law-related services because of their training, expertise, and
adherence to professional rules of conduct.70 However, if lawyers are better
than nonlawyers at providing legal services that protect consumers, will
they not be able to retain a monopoly on those services even if statutes
against UPL are abolished (or more narrowly defined)?

65. Id. at 580 (“As we shall see, the significance of this legislation cannot be fully
understood until the parallel restrictions on lawyers are considered.”).
66. Green, supra note 3, at 1117 (“The premise of these rules is essentially that, when
lawyers practice law, they must avoid the corrupting influence of nonlawyers (other than, of
course, their own clients); clients are best served by lawyers who preserve their ‘professional
independence’ by avoiding unholy alliances with the laity.”).
67. Id. at 1144 (explaining that this “was the acknowledged motivation behind the
restrictions at their inception” and was “to expand lawyers’ turf”); id. at 1140–44 (tracing the
history of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that restrict lawyers from working with
nonlawyers and contending that these rules do so to protect lawyers’ monopoly on legal
services); id. at 1118, 1135 (contending that the real and “actual motivation” behind the
development of the rules originally was to “thwart competition,” “protect lawyers’
livelihood,” and increase profits); id. at 1135, 1145 (contending that today’s “justification”
to protect clients from lawyers being corrupted by nonlawyer’s influence “is a belated
explanation for restrictions that, at their inception, were transparently motivated by the
financial self-interest of the bar’s leadership”); see also McCarter, supra note 27, at 131–32
(“[S]cholars who have examined the data have consistently found no genuine threat to the
public from lay provision of legal services.”); Rhode, supra note 2, at 9 (“Although the
organized bar has often suggested that the campaign against lay practitioners ‘arose as the
result of a public demand,’ the consensus among historians is to the contrary.” (quoting John
C. Satterfield, The President’s Page, 48 A.B.A. J. 99, 112 (1962))).
68. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 557 (1984), available at
http://old.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&template=/CM/ContentDi
splay.cfm&ContentID=49184 (holding that the lawyer and accountant cannot jointly provide
tax advice and consultancy services to the client); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Op. 22 (1962), available at http://old.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_
Opinions&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=48388 (stating that a lawyer
cannot serve as a lawyer if the lawyer is in a partnership with an accountant).
69. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 557.
70. See Green, supra note 3, at 1146–47 (making a similar but broader point about rules
restricting collaboration between lawyers and nonlawyers and identifying other premises).
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II. UPL ON THE BORDER: TWO EXAMPLES
Arguably, UPL prohibitions are most contentious when applied to
services that lie on the border between business and law.71 In those areas,
nonlawyers already perform key roles and work with lawyers, and
sometimes nonlawyers and lawyers play the same roles. Two such areas
are compliance and claim funding (also known as alternative litigation
funding).72 This Part provides background on these types of professional
services and attempts to determine whether these services would be
considered the practice of law—or, rather, run the risk of being considered
the unauthorized practice of law when provided by nonlaywers. In order to
conduct this analysis, in light of the vague definition of the practice of law,
this Part attempts to compare the function of compliance officers and claim
funders to the traditional function of corporate attorneys.73
A. Compliance
Before analyzing whether compliance officers violate UPL prohibitions,
the following sections provide background on the compliance function at
large, publicly traded corporations and a description of what compliance
officers do. These sections incorporate quotes from the Compliance Study
interviews to animate how the compliance function is managed and viewed
by some general counsels and compliance officers.74
1. Background
As a result of changes to corporate criminal liability rules, sentencing
guidelines, and settlement patterns, most large, publicly traded corporations
in the United States now employ personnel dedicated to overseeing the
compliance function at their corporations and/or have compliance
departments.75 Historically, the general counsel has ultimately overseen the
compliance function at large, publically traded corporations.76 In the wake

71. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
72. For a definition of claim funding, see infra note 103.
73. See infra notes 82–83.
74. For a description of the Compliance Study, see supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
75. See generally DeStefano, supra note 12, at pt. II (providing an overview of the
regulatory history behind compliance and a general description of the compliance function at
large publicly traded corporations); Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships
Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 694 (2009) (“Over the last few
decades there has been tremendous growth in the importance of corporate compliance and
ethics programs in criminal and civil liability.”).
76. See DeStefano, supra note 12, at 73–74 (explaining that sometimes the general
counsel actually serves as the chief compliance officer); Ford & Hess, supra note 75, at 693
(making this point and that sometimes the CCO also reports to the CEO); Tanina Rostain,
General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New Research
Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 481 (2008) (finding that most of the ten CCOs in
her study reported to the general counsel); see also Roy Snell, Greg Luce Talks About the
Relationship Between Legal Counsel and Compliance, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE,
March–April 2007, at 31, 32 (“Notwithstanding the preference of the Office of Inspector
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of recent corporate scandals,77 however, and in response to government
incentives, corporations have begun to departmentalize the compliance
function from general counsel oversight, creating distinct and separate
compliance departments that report to the CEO and/or the Board of
Directors.78 Regardless of where they are housed, compliance departments
are generally comprised of many professionals that were trained in and
practiced law.79 A compliance officer does not, however, need to have a
General (OIG) to separate the compliance and general counsel functions, many organizations
include a report to the general counsel by the compliance officer.”).
77. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS, WHY WE FAIL TO DO
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 170, 171 (2011); Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office
of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, SEC, Compliance Programs: Our Shared
Mission (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022805lar.htm
(discussing the emergence of corporate misconduct across large and small industries and the
need for change in how “we all think about compliance”); see David Barstow, Vast Mexico
Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012,
at A1 (describing the corporate scandal of Wal-Mart de Mexico, where the company
allegedly spent millions of dollars on bribes to obtain permits across Mexico in order to
dominate the market).
78. Christine Parker & Sharon Gilad, Internal Corporate Compliance Management
Systems: Structure, Culture and Agency, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES
TO REGULATION 170 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011); ASEEM
PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN CLUBS, ISO
14001, AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 1–3 (2006) (same); DeStefano,
supra note 12, at 75–76; Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of Compliance
Programs and Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113, 1114–15 (1997); Lynn Sharp
Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 106,
106 (arguing sentencing guidelines that “base fines partly on the extent to which companies
have taken steps to prevent that misconduct” have motivated companies to reorganize);
Donna Boehme, Big Banks Giving the CCO a Seat at the Table, CORP. COUNS. (Mar.
1, 2013),
http://compliancestrategists.com/csblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/CorporateCounsel_-Big-Banks-Giving-the-CCO-a-Seat-at-the-Table.pdf; Donna Boehme, JPMorgan
Chase Takes a Giant Step on CCO Independence, CORP. COUNS. (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://compliancestrategists.com/csblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Corporate-Counsel_JPMorgan-Chase-Takes-a-Giant-Step-on-CCO-Independence.pdf
(explaining
that
historically the CCO was subordinate to the general counsel but that healthcare settlement
agreements are requiring that CCOs no longer report to the general counsel); cf. Christine
Parker, The Ethics of Advising on Regulatory Compliance: Autonomy or Interdependence?,
28 J. BUS. ETHICS 339, 339 (2000) (describing the various incentives that exist to motivate
corporations to voluntarily create compliance and ethics programs). Wal-Mart’s CCO
reported the CEO. See WalMart Global Compliance Action Steps, WALMART,
http://news.walmart.com/walmart-global-compliance-action-steps (last updated July 8,
2013); see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L. REV. 487, 490 (2003) (citing support for corporate liability
mitigation provisions for corporations that enhance internal compliance structures); Lori
Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, SEC, Instilling Lasting
and Meaningful Changes in Compliance (Oct. 28, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/spch102804lr.htm; Lori Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections &
Examinations, SEC, The New Compliance Rule: An Opportunity for Change (June 28,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch063004lar.htm [hereinafter
Richards, New Compliance Rule].
79. Parker, supra note 78, at 339; see Ford & Hess, supra note 75, at 693; see also
DeStefano, supra note 12, at 98 (citing studies that show that the general counsel is often
also the chief compliance officer); cf. Parker, supra note 3, at 181; David B. Wilkins, Team
of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2131–32 (2010) (citing Rostain, supra note 16, for this proposition).
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law degree or any type of compliance or ethics certification.80 This is
because—according to various sources including secondary literature, the
government, general counsels, and compliance professionals—compliance
is not considered the practice of law.81 Chief compliance officers (CCOs),
when playing the role of compliance officer, are not acting as in-house
lawyers representing the company, even if they were or are active members
of the bar.82 The following subsection analyzes the function of compliance
officers to evaluate whether compliance services violate UPL
prohibitions.83
2. What Do Compliance Officers Do and Is This the
Unauthorized Practice of Law?
The job of a compliance officer has two main focuses: (1) preventing,
detecting, and responding to compliance transgressions, and (2) managing
corporate ethics.84 Thus, a major part of the compliance officer’s job is to
monitor, create, and implement policies and programs to ensure that

80. See DeStefano, supra note 12, at 101.
81. See id. at 91 n.83; Richards, New Compliance Rule, supra note 78 (“Routine
compliance monitoring is not subject to attorney-client privilege.”); see also, e.g., Parker,
supra note 3, at 181–83 (reporting the number of new professional associations and
backgrounds of compliance professionals); id. at 186 (“[C]ompliance professionalism poses
a challenge to legal professionalism by making compliance advice and application the
province of a variety of people within the company with different skills and with
responsibilities at all levels.”); Parker, supra note 78, at 339; Anonymous Telephone
Interview with Vice President Deputy General Counsel (June 24, 2010) (“What I tell people
is that the compliance work, we should consider it probably not to be privileged. And so
when I do my compliance work, I always make sure they would have work product
[protection] and I tell my clients, because a lot of times my clients are the same.”); SOC’Y OF
CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS & THE HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE ASS’N, SHOULD
COMPLIANCE REPORT TO THE GENERAL COUNSEL? 6 (2013), available at http://www.hccainfo.org/Resources/View/ArticleId/910/Should-Compliance-Report-to-the-GeneralCounsel.aspx (reporting that compliance professionals believe there is a conflict of interest
between lawyers’ role as defender of the corporation and compliance officers’ duty to
report).
82. See DeStefano, supra note 12, at 128–29 (quoting CCOs and general counsels from
the Compliance Study).
83. Again, this is difficult because the UPL prohibitions are so broad that the answer can
always be that that nonlawyers are violating UPL prohibitions if they do any service that
lawyers commonly provide. Therefore, to tackle this question, I seek to confine the
comparison to traditional notions of what lawyers do.
84. See DeStefano, supra note 12, at 93; Ford & Hess, supra note 75, at 689–95
(showing that corporate compliance programs now focus on compliance, ethics, and
corporate culture); Paine, supra note 78, at 106 (explaining that the goal of a compliance
department is to “prevent, detect, and punish legal violations. But organizational ethics
means more than avoiding illegal practice . . . [and requires] a comprehensive approach”);
Parker, supra note 3, at 183 (“[C]ompliance professionals understand their work as being
about the articulation, accommodation and harmonisation of legal norms to organisational
culture, corporate governance systems and business goals.”); Parker, supra note 78, at 340;
Caron Carlson, How the Modern CCO Came To Be, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Feb. 20, 2008,
available at http://www.complianceweek.com/how-the-modern-cco-came-to-be/article/
185468/.
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employees comply with the law, regulations, and any other ethical rules of
the corporation.85 As one compliance officer explained,
Compliance officers need to be very good at figuring out what the law is,
and explaining it to your clients. At that point, as a lawyer, you have
done everything you are supposed to do. Compliance is getting up out of
your chair and following your clients back into their business and making
sure they really are doing all of the things that you’ve advised them to
do.86

As another CCO explained: “I’m in charge of making sure that everyone
understands the [laws] and follows them so that the company . . . and the
individual stays out of trouble.”87
In comparison, a nonlawyer compliance officer described his job as
follows:
First and foremost . . . being aware of all the regulations or laws that
could adversely affect the company and devising programs, plans, [and]
strategies to adhere to the laws, while at the same time not making it too
difficult for the company to make money to do what it does best. So you
find a way to make sure that the company stays . . . on top of the laws and
that . . . they’re obeying [them]. You look at how the laws are being
interpreted . . . a lot of times what is said versus how it’s prosecuted
sometimes is a little bit different, so my job was to stay appraised of all
those things and devise programs that could basically keep the company
compliant without straying too far from doing what we need to do to
make money.88

As indicated above, despite the general view that people working in
compliance are not acting as lawyers, compliance officers are (or are
perceived as) either interpreting the law or giving legal advice. Indeed, as
many interviewees in the Compliance Study exclaim, “[T]he problem you
often face is compliance officers giving legal advice—and it’s hard for
them not to do it sometimes, given the nature and scope of their jobs and
that many of them were trained as lawyers.”89 Indeed, internal clients, and
even lawyers working within the legal department itself, sometimes believe
that they can receive (or are receiving) legal advice from the compliance
officer.90

85. See Parker, supra note 78, at 346 (“Law must be translated into training that makes
sense to line managers and staff and, where possible, into operational procedures and
principles that fit into what already happens.”); see also Compliance Procedures and
Practices of Certain Investment Companies, 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2014); Ben W.
Heineman, Jr., Don’t Divorce the GC And Compliance Officer, CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2011, at
49; Richards, New Compliance Rule, supra note 78. See generally Carlson, supra note 84;
DeStefano, supra note 12 (reporting findings from a study that included interviews with over
seventy general counsels and CCOs).
86. Anonymous Telephone Interview with Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer (June
21, 2010).
87. Anonymous Telephone Interview with Compliance Manager (May 19, 2011).
88. Anonymous Telephone Interview with Compliance Manager (May 18, 2011).
89. Anonymous Telephone Interview with General Counsel (Aug. 26, 2010).
90. Anonymous Telephone Interview with Chief Compliance Officer (June 30, 2010).
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My job is basically reading whatever the law or regulation says. You
look for what are the controls . . . like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Bottom-line is for thirty pages of jargon that boils down to, you need to
have an adequate program, audit program or financial controls, training,
things of that nature . . . . I’d always look at the precedent, if one existed,
for companies that maybe had violated some law and to look how it’s
interpreted . . . .91

This compliance officer explained he would reach out to the legal team
when he was confused and say, “[T]his is what I’m seeing here, the
regulation says X, however, the way the Court interpreted it is a little bit
different. Help me understand this.”92 But otherwise, he felt he could
interpret new regulations and implement programs and policies to ensure
compliance with them.93
Although it may not be an accurate point of differentiation (and indeed
many general counsels would disagree), compliance officers distinguish
what they do from what lawyers do by explaining that lawyers say what you
can do and compliance officers say what you should do.94 Although both
the general counsel and the CCO are in the “risk mitigation business,” the
“general counsel may restructure a deal to minimize the risk and [the CCO]
may stop the deal to minimize the risk,” i.e., “[t]he Compliance Officer has
to stop things or can stop things, but the lawyer has to figure out a way to
get to where [the client] wants to go.”95
In terms of the ethics component and how it differs from the regulatory
aspect of the CCO position, one interviewee summed it up aptly:
You have certain rules, whether it’s regulatory rules, whether it’s court
rulings, whether it’s internal policies, etc., and you outline what the rules
are and you communicate them and you hold people to them . . . [The
ethics component], on the other hand, it’s broader, it’s more holistic in a
sense, it’s culture, it’s doing the right thing, understanding how you treat
people in a certain way and the thinking is that if you have an ethical
culture and the compliance rules would flow because you’ll do—you’ll

91. Anonymous Telephone Interview with Compliance Manager, supra note 88.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. This was true of the interviewees and also true of compliance officers quoted in the
press. Anonymous Telephone Interview with Chief Compliance Officer (July 14, 2010)
(“The risk is that you will see lawyers that are more akin or more used to basically putting
the answer in terms of whether or not you can do it instead of whether or not you should.”);
see Anonymous Telephone Interview with General Counsel (June 17, 2010) (“Legal tells
you what you can do to comply with the law—what you literally need to do to comply with
the law. Compliance tells you what you should do to comply with the spirit of the law—may
be more than legally required.”); see also Roy Snell, Letter from the CEO, COMPLIANCE
TODAY, Dec. 2009, at 18, available at http://www.hcca-info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/
Compliance_Today/1209/ct1209_18_CEO.pdf (“‘The lawyers tell you whether you can do
something, and compliance tells you whether you should.’” (quoting Lewis Morris of the
Office of Inspector General)).
95. Anonymous Telephone Interview with Compliance Manager, supra note 87.
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naturally do what’s appropriate, whether you know specifically what the
rules or the regulations say.”96

But the ethics part of the CCO’s job is not that different from the ethics part
of the general counsel’s job. Many general counsels believe that creating
an ethical culture is their responsibility and describe this as an important
aspect of their function in the company:
In our case, the legal function is independent but very integrated in
business. We have a strong GC, and insist on adherence on principles
rules and tools. All my in-house lawyers sit with and report to the
business units on a matrix and report to the VP they advise but they
directly report to me, so my guys all have the ability to say no when they
have to and are not dependent on the VP for performance evaluations or
bonuses. This helps us maintain an ethical compass. This is the most
important job—maintaining and aligning an ethical compass.97

Thus, what CCOs do and how they perceive their role in the corporate
client’s management structure is not that different from what a general
counsel does and how a general counsel describes his or her function. If
UPL statutes are interpreted to apply to the types of services and advice
corporate attorneys provide to clients (in other words, if UPL boundaries
expand with the role of the corporate attorney), almost all law-related
professional services could be considered UPL when conducted by a
nonlawyer. This is because corporate attorneys today, in order to provide
comprehensive legal advice to their clients, provide (or at least rely on) an
array of law-related services, such as public relations or banking, financial,
and accounting services.98 The way that compliance is managed and
viewed is further support for my contention in other articles that the law of
lawyering is oriented around an artificial distinction between legal advice
and “other” services (business, strategic, etc.),99 and it is motivated by
protectionist reasons as an effort to maintain a monopoly on the law and
legal services market.100
I am not contending that the ethics part of the CCO’s job is—or should
be considered—the practice of law, even if the definitions of the practice of
law in UPL statutes might cover it. But the other part of the compliance
officer’s job—the part that attempts to interpret new laws and regulations
and counsel the client on how to comply with those laws and regulations—
actually appears to overlap with the traditional job of the corporate attorney.
As mentioned above, it appears to those people working with compliance

96. Id.
97. Anonymous Telephone Interview with General Counsel (Apr. 19, 2010).
98. Beardslee, supra note 7, at 736–42. Arguably, the fact that general counsels oversee
ethics does not render such oversight a legal service that nonlawyers can no longer perform.
As a parallel, the director of public relations does not violate UPL prohibitions when
offering advice about legal controversies, although managing public relations around such
controversies is now a core part of any general counsel’s job.
99. Beardslee, supra note 4, at 1925–32.
100. See Green, supra note 3, at 1128–32; see also DeStefano, supra note 5, at 2794–95.
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officers (even to the lawyers within the corporation) that compliance
officers are practicing law.
B. Claim Funding
Before analyzing whether claim funders practice law and, therefore,
violate UPL prohibitions, the following section provides background on the
claim funding industry, a hypothetical example of commercial claim
funding,101 and a description of what claim funders do.102
1. Background
Claim funding is the provision of finance to an individual or company
that holds a claim (claimholder) by a person or entity other than a lawyer,
law firm, or insurance agent.103 Like a contingency fee arrangement, in
exchange for funding, the claim funder receives an interest in the proceeds
of the prospective settlement, judgment, or award if the claimholder
prevails. 104 Claim funding is a type of nonrecourse financing.105
101. This Article focuses on commercial claim funding as opposed to consumer claim
funding.
102. These sections are based on secondary literature, conferences I have attended, and
also my experience as a consultant to a start-up claim funding company that, since its
inception, has closed its doors.
103. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 11, at 6; see also STEVEN
GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2010),
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_
OP306.pdf (describing alternative litigation financing as the “provision of capital (money)
by nontraditional sources to civil plaintiffs, defendants, or their lawyers to support litigationrelated activities”).
104. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 11, at 6.
105. In some cases the loans may be recourse but generally they are not. See, e.g.,
Introduction, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND CLAIM
TRANSFER: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (Geoffrey
McGovern et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS], available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2010/RAND_CF272.pdf;
Selvyn Seidel, Stakeholders and Products in Third-Party Funding Arrangements, in
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 4–5; see also JOHN BEISNER, JESSICA MILLER & GARY
RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE:
THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2009), available at
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf (“Third-party financing
contracts generally resemble non-recourse loans: if the party recovers nothing, it does not
have to repay the funding company.”); Nathan M. Crystal, Professional Ethical Issues in
Third-Party Litigation Financing, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra, at 15–18; Timothy
D. Scrantom, Sources and Structures of Claim Investments, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
supra, at 11–12. Avoiding usury laws is one reason why the loans are not recourse and the
structure contemplates a purchase of an interest in the claim or the proceeds. Some state
courts have held that nonrecourse claim funding agreements are not loans and therefore are
not limited by usury rules. See, e.g., Dopp v. Yari, 927 F. Supp. 814, 824 (D.N.J. 1996);
Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d. 679, 683–84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Nyquist v. Nyquist, 841
P.2d 515, 518 (Mont. 1992); Anglo-Dutch Petrol. Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 98–
99 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); BEISNER, MILLER, & RUBIN, supra, at 2 (stating that third-party
funding “avoids prohibitions against usury”). Other state courts (in the consumer context),
however, have found that the loans from claim funders are limited by usury rules. See, e.g.,
Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Suthers, No. 10CV8380, slip op. at 6 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 28,
2011), available at http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/press_
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In the claim sourcing and selecting process, a typical commercial claim
funder looks for claims that have the potential for a 400 percent return over
an average three-year investment life.106 The claim funder’s share of
recovery generally ranges from 20 to 50 percent,107 and is based on a
calculation that includes the value of the case, risk analysis and tolerance,
complexity of the claim, anticipated time to recovery, the amount of the
original investment or funds already spent pursuing the claim, and
settlement opportunity.108 Given that most cases settle, one claim funding
company explained in its frequently asked questions sheet: “Time-to-return
is one of the principal unknowns in claim investing.”109 Claim funders
“intend[] to only invest in claims that have compelling settlement prospects
and reasonably knowable settlement ranges, settlement timing is a key
variable.”110
Claim funders provide financing for consumers, businesses, and law
firms for a variety of purposes; these include alleviating litigation costs,
assisting chief financial officers or general counsels to manage risk and
stabilize litigation budgets, and helping the corporate claimholder stay in
business while waiting for the claim recovery.111 Claim funding enables
releases/2011/09/29/oasis_order.pdf (holding that “the transactions” between the funder and
claimholder “create debt under the plain language of the UCCC” and “are ‘loans’ governed
by the UCCC”); Lawsuit Fin., LLC v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 238–40 (Mich. Ct. App.
2004).
106. See, e.g., Anonymous Claim Funding Company Frequently Asked Questions 13
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
107. Id. at 14. This number is lower for passively managed claims (around 20 to 35
percent of gross claim recoveries), higher for actively managed claims (around 25 to 45
percent), and even greater for acquired claims (around 70 percent). Id. For a description of
the difference between active and passive claim management, see infra notes 130–37 and
accompanying text. For a more detailed description and comparison, see Michele
DeStefano, Claim Funders and Commercial Claim Holders: A Common Interest or a
Common Problem?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 1701 (2014).
108. BEISNER, MILLER & RUBIN, supra note 105, at 2; Jonathan Molot, Litigation
Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO L.J. 65, 93–94 (2010); see
Anonymous Claim Funding Company Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 106, at 14
(“[Commercial claim funder] seeks to optimally invest money in pursuit of a claim to yield
monetization at an optimal point in the life of the claim. An optimally pursued claim
manages capital outflows and time to settlement or litigation such that the greatest net
recovery is obtained in the shortest amount of time. An optimally pursued claim achieves
the highest internal rate of return (IRR) for the total investment. To illustrate, if a
claimholder were to invest $1M, and was offered a settlement of $3M one year later, the IRR
on this hypothetical investment would be 200%. If plaintiff were to invest $1M and was
offered a settlement of $5M 2 years later, the IRR would be 124%.”); id. at 14 (“Generally,
there will be a $10 million limit per claim. [Commercial claim funder’s] targeted individual
claim investment will be $3 million–$10 million on an expected lifecycle of two to four
years. Capital will likely be “drip-fed” over time as ongoing operational costs are required
to prosecute the claim, but tranches or levels may also be funded on a lump sum basis.”).
109. Anonymous Claim Funding Company Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 106,
at 10.
110. Id.
111. See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation
Funding, 56 MERCER L. REV. 649, 649–50 (2005). The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct prevent lawyers from “provid[ing] financial assistance to a client in connection with
pending or contemplated litigation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8e (2013).
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claimholders to continue to work with their law firm of choice, even if that
law firm does not offer contingency fee arrangements or it has
overextended its funding capacity.112
The claim funding industry is growing rapidly113 and is projected to
approach over one billion dollars in value nationwide.114 Although some
states still prohibit claim funding by nonlawyers via old doctrines of
maintenance, champerty, and barratry,115 more than half allow claim
112. John C. Coates et al., Hiring Teams, Firms, and Lawyers: Evidence of the Evolving
Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1002, 1012–15
(2011) (presenting findings from an empirical study of chief legal officers, that for important
matters, corporate claimholders hire outside counsel based “on relationship factors” and that
selection is “almost always determined” by prior personal experience working with the
lawyer or team of lawyers).
113. Claim funding is prevalent in the United Kingdom and Australia. See Nikki Tait,
Third-Party Funds Backing $174M Claim Against Auditor, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at 1
(“Litigation funding . . . has become more established in some overseas jurisdictions, notably
Australia.”); Wayne Attrill, Ethical Issues in Litigation Funding, CLAIMS FUNDING INT’L 1, 2
(Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.claimsfunding.eu/fileadmin/Documents/Ethical_Issues_
Paper.pdf; see also LAW COUNCIL AUSTL., REGULATION OF THIRD PARTY LITIGATION
FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA: POSITION PAPER (2011), available at http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/
lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/a-z-docs/
RegulationofthirdpartylitigationfundinginAustralia.pdf.
Claim funding also occurs in
Germany and Switzerland. See Andreas Frischknecht & Vera Schmidt, Privilege and
Confidentiality in Third Party Funder Due Diligence: The Positions in the United States
and Switzerland and the Resulting Expectations Gap in International Arbitration, 8 TDM 1,
16 (Oct. 2011), http://www.chaffetzlindsey.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/tv8-4article04.pdf. For a review of the status of claim funding in the United Kingdom and
Australia, see DeStefano, supra note 5, at 2821–23. In the United States, however, claim
funding is considered an emerging industry. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20,
supra note 11, at 7 (explaining that it is an emerging industry in the United States); id. at 41
(“The market for alternative litigation finance involves suppliers and customers who demand
this form of financing. Because of this demand, and because of the complexity of regulation
in various states, the specific form of [alternative litigation funding] transactions will
undoubtedly continue to evolve.”); see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010
WIS. L. REV. 749, 754–59, 788–97 (discussing both traditional and emerging law firm
models and trends in claim funding).
114. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 pt. I (2011) (“As
of 2011, [the third-party litigation financing] industry has continued to grow, both as to the
number and types of lawsuits financed and financing provided. The aggregate amount of
litigation financing outstanding is estimated to exceed $1 billion.”); New York City Bar
Gives Thumbs Up to Litigation-Funding, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT
(June 20, 2011),
http://archive-com.com/page/481471/2012-10-19/http://newsandinsight
.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/06_-_June/New_York_
City_Bar_gives_thumbs_up_to_litigation-funding/ (“The practice of seeking funding for
cases from outside investors has been on the rise for the past 20 years, the [New York City
Bar A]ssociation said. It has moved from a cottage industry of personal-injury cases to a $1
billion business involving a wide swath of commercial litigation.”). This growth has been
predicted, in part, because of the “global recession, which has created more claims but less
funds to pursue them,” along with “an appetite for new, alternative assets.” Maya Steinitz,
The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 459 n.2 (2012). According
to Professor Steinitz, “The expansion of litigation funding is also driven by a global
transformation of legal services egged on by the Legal Profession Act 2004, which allows
incorporation of legal practices in Australia, and the Legal Services Act, which allows
investment in British law firms.” Id. (citations omitted).
115. See, e.g., MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333–34 (Va. 1998) (citing
Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Ct. App. 1976)); see also In re
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funding in some form.116 Further, claim funders have been funding cases
for over twenty years in the United States117 in both the consumer118 and
commercial context.119 Today, there are between thirty and eighty
companies in the United States that offer claim funding.120
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978) (“[M]aintenance is helping another prosecute a suit;
champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry
is a continuing practice of maintenance or champerty.”); AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS
20/20, supra note 11, at 10 (“Champerty is considered a type of maintenance.”). For a
description and analysis of these doctrines in the claim funding context, see generally
Richmond, supra note 111. Some courts deny agreements that assign the cause of action
itself, but they approve those that assign a portion of the proceeds, because they can be
viewed as an enforceable equitable assignment similar to an insurance contract. See Goodley,
133 Cal. Rptr. at 85; see also Costanzo v. Costanzo, 590 A.2d 268, 271 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1991). Other courts claim that there is no distinction. See, e.g., Karp v. Speizer, 647 P.2d
1197, 1199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Town & Country Bank of Springfield v. Country Mut.
Ins. Co., 459 N.E.2d 639, 640–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic
Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 121–22 (2011) (“[T]he common law of the United States
embraces free assignability in all choses of action except personal injury . . . , legal
malpractice (except when it does), and fraud (except when it does).”).
116. See Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1297, 1333–41 (2002); Sebok, supra note 115, at 98–99 & n.162 (specifying that 28
jurisdictions allow champerty with some limitations).
117. See, e.g., Killian v. Millard, 279 Cal. Rptr. 877, 878 (Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that
plaintiffs were “[u]nable to personally finance their lawsuit” and thus “syndicated it by
creating 50 ‘units’ for sale at $10,000 per unit with a 2-unit minimum per investor”); Susan
Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?,
30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 498 (1992). Those states that do allow claim funding, however, often
only do so if there is limited influence and control by the funder. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1349.55(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2012); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193
S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note
11, at 22; see also id. at 25 (“Even in states permitting an [alternative litigation funding]
supplier to obtain an interest in a party’s cause of action, retention by the supplier of control
over the decision-making of the party and its counsel, via a contractual provision between
the supplier and the party, may be deemed unlawful as champerty or maintenance.”). For a
history of the doctrine and its current status, see generally Sebok, supra note 115. For an
overview of the case law and regulations on claim funding, see Steinitz, supra note 114, at
460 n.6. In Australia, however, claim funding is allowed even when the funder has a high
level of control and influence over case management. See Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd.
v Fostif Pty Ltd., (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/
au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/41.html (upholding claim funding agreement wherein the funder had
a level of control and influence over case management); Domson Pty Ltd. v Zhu [2005]
NSWSC 1070, ¶¶ 74–77 (Austl.), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/scjudgments/
2005nswsc.nsf/2005nswsc.nsf/WebView2/F0A04DA2784A83A1CA2570A00025114B?Ope
nDocument.
118. Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a
Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 84 n.4 (2008) (“Nevertheless, it is
fairly well known that many large lawsuits, such as the vitamins anti-trust suit, the asbestos
cases and the Vioxx cases, have been supported by litigation financing companies which are
funded by banks, private equity and hedge funds.”); Alison Frankel, The Loan Arrangers,
AM. LAW., Oct. 1, 2005, at 74.
119. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2012, at 38,
43 (stating that Burford Capital invested millions of dollars in the Ecuadoran case against
Chevron); see also Burford Capital Profits Up 965%, STOCKMARKETWIRE (Apr. 4, 2012,
09:02 AM), http://www.stockmarketwire.com/article/4343538/Burford-Capital-profits-up965pct.html (reporting Burford’s expected net profits at approximately $32 million in 2011).
120. Member Providers, AM. LEGAL FIN. ASS’N, http://www.americanlegalfin.com/
OfficersAndMembers.asp (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (having at least thirty-nine members);
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Commercial claim companies are often founded and/or led by people that
are trained as lawyers with extensive experience in litigation, negotiation,
and resolution of complex commercial claims.121 Indeed, a common way
that a commercial claim funder finds a case is through or because of his or
her prior career and success as a trial attorney. Like a compliance officer,
however, a claim funder does not need to have a law degree, because like
compliance, claim funding is not considered to be the practice of law.
Claim funders are not lawyers representing the claimholders, even if they
are or were practicing lawyers.122 The next subsection illustrates the claim
funding dynamic through a hypothetical example of a situation ripe for

see GARBER, supra note 103, at 10 n.14 (stating that there might be as many as eighty claim
funding companies); see also Michael G. Blum, Financial Management in a Contingent Fee
Practice, FINDLAW (Mar. 26, 2008), http://practice.findlaw.com/financing-a-law-firm/
financial-management-in-a-contingent-fee-practice.html (explaining that some provide claim
funding in the commercial context while others do so in the consumer context). Many
businesses invest in personal injury claims (which are outside the scope of this Article). A
number of hedge funds and public companies also invest in commercial claims. Margie
Lindsay, Third-Party Litigation Funding Finds Favour with Hedge Funds, HEDGE FUNDS
REV. (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/news/120119.html; see also
Steinitz, supra note 114, at 461. For example, PeachTree Financial Solutions, owned by
Credit Suisse, “purchase[s] assets including structured legal settlements, annuities, lottery
winnings, sports contracts and life insurance policies.” About Us, PEACHTREE FIN.
SOLUTIONS, http://peachtreefinancial.com/company/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). Hedge
funds include Centurion, Eton Park, Elliot, Fortress, arms of Deutschbank, Credit Suisse
(from which Parabellum Capital LLC recently spun off), and Allianz (which recently
stopped its direct funding activities due to internal conflicts of interest). Companies
dedicated to commercial claim funding include Juridica Investments (AIM-listed company),
Burford Capital (AIM-listed company), and IMF (public company listed on the Australian
Securities Exchange), Bentham Capital (IMF’s U.S. subsidiary), and BlackRobe Capital
(recently closed its doors due to internal conflict). See Jennifer Smith, Litigation Finance
Firm BlackRobe Shuts Down, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2013, at B3. In the United Kingdom,
several private companies have entered the litigation funding market, including Harbour and
Calanius. Insurance companies invest in commercial claims (through subrogation and other
techniques like providing insurance to the claim funder against loss of the principal should
the claim fail). See Steinitz, supra note 114, at 461–62.
121. For example, the three founders and leaders of BlackRobe Capital were John P.
“Sean” Coffey, Timothy D. Scrantom, and Michael Chepiga. See Smith, supra note 120.
Coffey is a nationally recognized plaintiffs’ litigator who retired in 2009 as co-managing
partner of Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP. Coffey served as lead counsel on
cases with recoveries totaling in excess of $10 billion. See Renowned Trial Lawyer John P.
“Sean” Coffey Joins Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel in New York: The Former NY
Attorney General Candidate Will Lead the Firm’s Complex Litigation Group, KRAMER
LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.kramerlevin.com/RenownedTrial-Lawyer-John-P-Sean-Coffey-Joins-Kramer-Levin-Naftalis--Frankel-in-New-YorkThe-Former-NY-Attorney-General-Candidate-Will-Lead-the-Firms-Complex-LitigationGroup-11-14-2013/. Tim Scrantom was a barrister, a contingency fee lawyer, and the
founder of Juridica, where he was president through the deployment of most of its investable
capital. See Litigation Finance, SCRANTOM DULLES, http://www.sdils.com/main/litigationfinance#.UxkVa-ddXlo (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). Mike Chepiga has thirty years’
experience as a defense lawyer at a major Wall Street law firm, where he defended several of
the most high-profile securities and mergers and acquisitions matters of the past few
decades. See Prominent Corporate Litigator Michael J. Chepiga Joins BlackRobe Capital,
PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/prominentcorporate-litigator-michael-j-chepiga-joins-blackrobe-capital-146663185.html.
122. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 11, at 22.
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claim funding and the role claim funding can play in the commercial
context.
2. Claim Funding Example
A new government of Egypt retains WeSpy, an investigative firm
specializing in locating and seizing assets that have been misappropriated
by corrupt public officials, to find several hundred million dollars that
members of a prior military junta had illegally skimmed from Egypt’s
military budget.123 WeSpy’s contract provides that it will receive 25
percent of all assets that it helps seize and return to the new government.
Two years into the contract, WeSpy secures and wires to the new
government $300 million. Within a few days of the wire, the new
government writes a letter to WeSpy canceling their contract, claiming that
WeSpy breached the contract by failing to exercise appropriate diligence in
pursuing assets and devoting enough resources to the project. To date,
WeSpy has spent $5 million on the project.
WeSpy wants to sue the new government for breach of contract on
pretext grounds, which, per the contract agreement, has to occur via
arbitration in London. WeSpy seeks advice from its preferred outside law
firm. The lawyers investigate the situation and conclude that the odds of
winning are about 75 percent and that pursuing the claim will cost WeSpy
about $3 million. WeSpy is distraught because $3 million is larger than its
entire litigation budget for the next two years; further, the company is in
debt. It would be willing to settle at $45 million because it could use the
cash. WeSpy asks its lawyers if they will do the case on contingency, but
the lawyers say that they cannot. Their firm is not a contingency fee firm
nor is it structured to offer contingency fees. WeSpy really does not want
to hire lawyers whose main line of business is suing companies, managers,
and directors; it prefers to use its current law firm with whom it has a
longstanding relationship and whose lawyers know WeSpy’s business best.
The lawyer tells WeSpy that it might be able to get funding from a
commercial claim funder that will loan WeSpy the money for a piece of the
recovery. WeSpy is intrigued. The lawyer then calls the commercial claim
funder, a former partner at a law firm where the lawyer used to work.
The commercial claim funder conducts due diligence on the case
(analyzing it from a financial and legal standpoint) and ultimately decides
to offer funding to the claim holder. It provides a term sheet to WeSpy that
explains that it will fund the prosecution for up to $3 million on a
nonrecourse basis, in return for the first $9 million of any recovery or 25
percent of the gross recovery, whichever is larger. The law firm will be
paid at 80 percent of their typical rates, with the balance plus 5 percent of
the recovery paid. The commercial claim company will fund the case in
three stages: first, up to $750,000 through the filing of the notice of
123. This hypothetical is based loosely on a hypothetical that I helped revise and that was
presented and discussed at the Federal Bar Council Conference on January 17, 2012, in
Hawaii by a panel that included Sean Coffey, Peter Jarvis, Tony Sebok, and James Hubbard.
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arbitration and selection of the arbitrators; second, up to $1 million for the
arbitration itself; and third, up to $500,000 for appeals and enforcement of
the judgment. Further, the term sheet provides that the claim funding
company must be consulted before WeSpy makes any settlement offer, and
that the commercial claimholder must be advised of any settlement offer
received.
3. What Do Claim Funders Do and
Is This the Unauthorized Practice of Law?
As described above in the WeSpy hypothetical, at the prefunding stage,
prior to committing funds, claim funders scrub the case. They evaluate the
claim and perform due diligence and underwriting to determine the value of
the claim and the economics around the risk of failure.124 In order to
conduct such due diligence, claim funders need to assess the legal merits of
the case. They do this by reviewing the public case pleadings, dockets and
memoranda, and discoverable evidence (including documents and witness
testimony). They also seek review of confidential information that might
be protected by the work product or attorney-client privilege doctrine.125
They review and assess the case file, the claimholder’s lawyers’ views of
the claim, and the current or proposed litigation strategy. They investigate
the claimholder. And they provide written opinions and financial
assessments of the claim to the claimholder and its lawyers.126 Further,
they do this by assigning strategic advisors to the case. These strategic
advisors are generally lawyers with substantive expertise in the subject
matters involved in the case, experts in litigation risk, and/or experts in the
risks, ethics, and varying state laws related to claim funding.127 One
commercial claim funder described the prefunding stage as follows: “The
pre-funding stage involves developing strategic and tactical plans for the
case, creating a budget, helping identify the right lead and supplemental law
firms, engaging experts, designing a strategic plan for claim monetization,
and assisting in gathering and evaluating evidence.”128 In sum, before
funding the case, claim funders perform almost the same tasks that a
contingency fee law firm might in assessing whether to take the case.129
124. W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation Finance and Anti-commodification
Norms (Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 13-91, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2261343## (describing the extensive
amount of due diligence conducted by commercial claim funders and its importance).
125. For a discussion of whether such sharing of information waives attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine protection, see generally DeStefano, supra note 107.
126. For a discussion of whether such work would be considered work product under the
work-product doctrine, see id. at 1749–1762.
127. For a description and analysis of these doctrines in the claim funding context, see
Richmond, supra note 111, at 652–69.
128. Anonymous Claim Funding Company Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 106,
at 9.
129. For descriptions of the types of due diligence conducted, see Jason Lyon, Comment,
Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV.
571, 592 & n.150, 593, 597 (2010); see also GARBER, supra note 103, at 26; Jonathan T.
Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 387–90 (2009); Aaron Katz &
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Post-funding behavior can differ slightly.130 Sometimes claim funders
take a more passive approach to managing the claims, with only minor
input from the investor into the claimholder’s strategy, team, budget,
financial management, or settlement.131 But, as other scholars and courts
have pointed out, because the claim funders have a lot of money at stake
and are shouldering the risk, they follow the case and work with the lawyers
on a day-to-day or at least weekly basis.132 Further, the claimholder and the
attorneys value their point of view because they are often former successful
law firm partners. Moreover, as depicted in the WeSpy hypothetical, the
attorneys are usually responsible for sourcing the claim funder, so they take
great interest in protecting the preexisting relationship and preserving trust
and respect. Thus, even in the passive approach, claim funders will be
somewhat involved.
Other claim funders take an even more active approach, offering capital
and expertise. They partner with the claimholder’s choice of law firm to
manage and oversee the case and monitor the law firm’s performance and
legal strategy. They track the cash burn rate and the financial aspects of the
claim’s proceedings—and, as in WeSpy, tie future funding to the progress
of the case. They collaborate with the claimholder to develop settlement
strategy. They hire and manage extralegal professionals, such as public
relations, foreign diplomacy, and accounting professionals. They work to
restructure the claim asset to accommodate additional funding and attempt
to add value to the overall monetization strategy. 133 As one commercial
claim funder explained:
[The claim funder] transcends the role of capital-provider and becomes
the overall strategic partner with the claimholder. While neither
practicing law nor giving legal advice, the [claim funder’s] team of
experts offers strategic leadership to counsel, consultants, and
Steven Schoenfeld, Third-Party Litigation Financing: Commercial Claims As an Asset
Class, PRAC. L.J. TRANSACTIONS & BUS., Mar. 2012, at 36, 45, available at
http://www.parabellumcap.com/docs/March2012_ThirdPartyLitigation.pdf.
130. See DeStefano, supra note 107, at 1714–23 (describing the different approaches in
more detail).
131. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 11, at 23 (“[S]ome
[alternative litigation funding] suppliers disclaim any control over the decision-making of
lawyers, stating that they are in an entirely passive role.”); see also Martin, supra note 118,
at 109 (“[I]n the United States, litigation funders merely advance money to plaintiffs to use
any way they wish; they do not directly fund the litigation at all, a role that is, however,
permitted for U.S. attorneys.”).
132. Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the
Difference? 6–7 (The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 441,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247973 (explaining
that passive investing may more likely exist in the consumer context when the amount of
lending is fairly low but not necessarily when the investments are much larger as they are in
the commercial context); see AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 11, at
24; see also Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386, 434
(Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2006/41.html (stating that
funders should be able exert the same level of control and influence over litigation as
insurers).
133. Anonymous Claim Funding Company Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 106,
at 9.
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claimholders on issues involving strategy, economics, geographic and
political concerns, financial modeling, investigative work, and public
relations input.134

In other words, especially in the active context,135 claim funders view
themselves as “claim managers”136 who, in addition to evaluating and
managing legal strategies, oversee all law-related activities that are essential
to a successful outcome in today’s global, complex, highly litigated legal
marketplace.137 This is the role an active funder would play in the WeSpy
hypothetical above.
Nevertheless, the claim funders contend that they are not practicing law
and that they are not providing legal advice or services. Instead, they
explain,
[The claim funder] will not render “professional legal services,” even
though it expects to consult with the claimholder’s legal team on business
aspects of the litigation. Its approach to claim management services will
complement the roles played by the claimholder’s internal financial team,
its outside and in-house legal counsel, and other experts. Its strategic
management of the claim helps to better align the interests of the law firm
with those of the claimholder and other claim stakeholders. 138

However, this description sounds a lot like what a partner at a large top-tier
law firm does.
Thus, all claim funders, regardless of the extent to which they play an
active role, appear to rely on legal expertise in both the pre- and postfunding stages. They read and interpret laws and, like attorneys, seek to
implement the most effective and efficient litigation strategies. So, despite
the fact that claim funders are not practicing law, given the nature and scope
of their jobs, they still may be giving legal advice and providing something
that could be described as legal services.
If claim funders are affecting, manipulating, and advising on litigation
strategy, one might make an argument (like the one made regarding
compliance officers in Part II.A.2) that claim funders are violating UPL
134. Id. (explaining that the claim funder “believes that by being more active in claim
strategy, management and, where possible, settlement discussions, time-to-return may be
optimized to some degree. Likewise, active participation in a claim prosecution allows [it]
to better manage the disbursement of its invested capital and the use of that capital against
agreed budgets and prosecution benchmarks”).
135. Arguably, this is also partly true in the passive context as many have argued that
claim funders look to affect legal strategy and settlement in either scenario. See DeStefano,
supra note 5, at 2824.
136. Anonymous Claim Funding Company Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 106,
at 7 (“It expects to accomplish this investment strategy through its world-class team, its
advanced underwriting and sourcing processes, and its next-generation claim management
techniques.”).
137. For a discussion of the importance of active management of public relations around
legal controversies, see Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public
Opinion Installment I: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1259 (2009).
138. Anonymous Claim Funding Company Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 106,
at 9–10.
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statutes—even if one defines the practice of law more narrowly and
traditionally.
III. ABOLISHING UPL STATUTES: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The preceding description and analysis fills a gap in the literature by
providing an in-depth look at two new types of law-related services that
challenge our understanding of defining the practice of law and the
boundaries of UPL statutes. Although UPL prohibitions are written very
broadly, many of the activities that lawyers and nonlawyers perform as
compliance officers and litigation funders appear to overlap with some of
the traditional notions of lawyering, such as interpreting the law and legal
regulations, providing advice on legal risk, and consulting with lawyers on
legal strategy. Arguably, if UPL violations were pursued in these areas,
they might be successful.139 The questions posed in this Article, however,
are these: What effect may the elimination of UPL prohibitions have on
lawyers’ monopoly in these areas that straddle the law-business divide, such
as compliance and claim funding? Will undoing UPL statutes make a dent
in that monopoly?140 What other effects might there be from such reform?
A. Hypothesis 1: Eliminating UPL Statutes May Not Overthrow Corporate
Lawyers’ Monopoly in Areas That Border Business and Law
Commentators hypothesize that the deregulation of business is eating
away at corporate lawyers’ monopoly.141 Interestingly, in the case of
compliance, there is an increase in regulation that has led to
departmentalization of compliance from the legal department and an
opportunity for nonlawyers to take on roles that were formerly owned by
lawyers. Given the costs associated with hiring lawyers, coupled with the
widely held belief that compliance is not a “legal” service requiring legal
advice, one might imagine that the number of nonlawyers managing
compliance is likely to increase if the trend of separating out compliance
from the legal department continues. To that end, many (if not most) of the
Compliance Study interviewees agreed with the point of view that
compliance could be effectively run by a nonlawyer.142 Some interviewees
pointed out qualities that a nonlawyer might have that a lawyer might not,
139. Perhaps legislators have not pursued these statutes because so many people that
work in these areas are lawyers, or because these areas are emerging industries that deal with
savvy clients. Therefore, the threat of information asymmetry may not be as great.
140. To that end, whether the threat of UPL prosecutions stops nonlawyers from taking
on these roles is unclear.
141. Parker, supra note 3, at 175 (“[G]eneral business deregulation is beginning to
achieve a partial loss of monopoly for corporate lawyers that was not accomplished by
regulatory reform aimed explicitly at the legal profession.”).
142. See Anonymous Telephone Interview with General Counsel (Aug. 5, 2010) (“I think
a nonlawyer—I mean I hate to say [can do the job] just as well [as a lawyer]. I think they
would bring different strengths and different weaknesses to the process and I think it’s very
personally dependent. I would say the [right] nonlawyer could do this job as well or maybe
better if it’s the right person.”); Anonymous Telephone Interview with Compliance Activist
Committee Member (Apr. 16, 2010) (“[A n]onlawyer can run compliance.”).
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like project management, technology, and training skills.143 Nevertheless,
most of the interviewees claimed that there were advantages to being a
lawyer. Indeed, when interviewees were asked “[I]f you were not a lawyer,
could you do your job?” most answered in the negative or replied along the
lines of “I could, but I think it would be difficult—you’d have to find
somebody with subject matter expertise in the area,”144 or, “yes . . . but it
helps to be one.”145 As another healthcare industry CCO (a former
practicing attorney) explained:
I think it is probably better to be a lawyer, because you have that sense of
gravitas. I think that even if you are not acting as a lawyer, you could
speak as a lawyer [so your audience] understand[s] that you have got legal
training. I have criminal defense experience, so I would say, “look, if you
want to hear stories about people who made some wrong choices, I have
got a billion of them.” . . . I am speaking from experience, so you know,
that helps I think. But it is preferred, not required . . . but I think in a
corporate setting, it probably makes sense for a compliance officer to be a
lawyer.146

It makes sense that a compliance officer in the healthcare industry, who has
a background in criminal law and a familiarity with sentencing guidelines,
would be better equipped to perform the role of compliance officer than a
nonlawyer. Although some of the skills required of compliance officers,
including project management, technology, and training, might not be the
skills taught in law school, interpreting and ensuring compliance with the
law, assessing legal risks, and providing advice about regulations and legal
strategy are at the core of what compliance officers do.
This is not that different from the role that claim funders play. While
claim funders need financial analysis and modeling capabilities, skills not
commonly taught in law school, the core of what claim funders do is
assessing legal risks and strategies employed in the claim litigation.
Further, the ethics training that law students receive in law school and
that lawyers (as part of the profession) are required to maintain in
continuing education credits to keep bar membership in many states might
add value to either role given the ethics involved in claim funding and
compliance. Thus, from an ethical standpoint, having a law degree might
be essential—and, at the very least, beneficial.

143. See Anonymous Telephone Interview with Compliance Manager (May 8, 2011)
(“Someone with a technology background could help to bridge the gap between the legal and
the business and the technology side.”); Anonymous Telephone Interview with General
Counsel, supra note 142 (“I’d start by saying they are like—they are more process experts.
So they establish policies and procedures, they advise the business on appropriate policies
and procedures for incorporating compliance activities, control activities into their regular
business processes, they provide training to the businesses.”); id. (“First of all, I think that’s
an area where the average lawyer is not particularly strong and that’s an area where I think
compliance departments are evolving. I think good compliance departments are starting to
hire more project managers and more technology people.”).
144. Anonymous Telephone Interview with Chief Compliance Officer (June 17, 2010).
145. Anonymous Telephone Interview with Chief Compliance Officer, supra note 94.
146. Anonymous Telephone Interview with Compliance Manager, supra note 87.
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Even if UPL rules were relaxed, the recent trend in corporate governance
has resulted in an increase in the number of compliance jobs. This may
actually enhance lawyers’ prospects of being hired for those jobs, creating a
demand for the new “business lawyer.” Moreover, some Compliance Study
interviewees mentioned that they would be open to hiring recent law school
graduates.147 This may create an opportunity for law schools to develop a
compliance certification that provides project management, technology, and
systems training to nonlawyers, lawyers, and law students. Generally
speaking, this certainly may bode well for lawyers and law firms. For
example, it may represent an opportunity for outside law firms to increase
business. Corporations might turn to law firms (as opposed to other
professional service providers) to offer ancillary services in these areas,
given the reconfiguration in the relationship between attorney and client
from one of agency to one of interdependency.148
The situation appears to be similar in the commercial claim funding
industry. Lawyers are forming claim funding start-ups and hiring lawyers
to work with them in due diligence and strategic advising.149 Do claim
funders also hire nonlawyers to help with law-related services like public
relations, government relations, and financial modeling? Yes, but if UPL
prohibitions were eliminated, it does not appear that nonlawyers would be
taking lawyers’ roles in these companies.
This same hypothesis might hold true in other areas where a bar license is
not required but education and legal practice add advantage and where we
have witnessed an increase in lawyers, such as investment banking, legal
process outsourcing, and accounting.150
B. Hypothesis 2: Eliminating UPL Statues Might
Enhance Risks and Create Negative Consequences
Part of the motivation behind creating the chief compliance officer role
and the trend of departmentalization is to enable those overseeing
compliance to do so without the obligations of a lawyer, such as a lawyer’s
independence, duty of confidentiality, and restricted reporting-up
requirements. The problem with this, however, is that if the lawyers
themselves are uncertain about whether the compliance officers are acting
147. Anonymous Telephone Interview with Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer, supra
note 86.
148. Wilkins, supra note 79, at 2100–01 (detailing the arrangement between Tyco and
Eversheds that contains an incentive for Eversheds to help Tyco in compliance initiatives to
“avoid getting into legal trouble in the first place”).
149. See
Fulbrook
Homepage,
FULBROOK
CAPITAL
MGMT.,
LLC
http://fulbrookmanagement.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); see also About Us,
PARABELLUM CAPITAL, http://www.parabellumcap.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
150. Remus, supra note 8, at 1259–60 (“Although laypeople routinely performed, and
continue to perform, quasi-legal work, increasing numbers of licensed lawyers are now
occupying quasi-legal roles. They include investment bankers, compliance officers,
consultants, and accountants; they lead hedge funds, banks, private equity firms, and large
corporations. With the collapse in the market for legal services, many young lawyers now
enter these quasi-legal roles directly from law school.” (footnotes omitted)).
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as lawyers,151 then surely the employees must be as well. Thus, there is the
risk that employees will assume that the compliance officers are providing
legal advice when, indeed, they are not. Employees are often already
misguided in thinking that the lawyers represent them (as opposed to the
corporation).152 Now, another confusing layer is added—lawyers, many of
whom formerly worked in the legal department and now work in the
compliance department, are not even lawyers anymore.153
The claim funder context presents a slightly different but similar
conundrum. The claimholder hires the funder, but the funder controls
settlement decisions. The funder behaves like another lawyer on the team,
influencing (if not controlling) settlement decisions and legal strategy,
which requires updates on case management and other confidential
information that may risk waiving the attorney-client privilege or other
protective doctrines. The claim funder even makes litigation strategy
recommendations. Yet the claim funder is not the claimholder’s lawyer.
This leads to a fundamental question: can a lawyer ever not be a lawyer?
One general counsel interviewee that was also the chief compliance officer
at his company did not believe so:
There is no such thing as a nonpracticing lawyer—purely practical—if
you are a lawyer you are a lawyer. It doesn’t matter if you are licensed to
practice law or not. People look at you as a lawyer and rely on you as
[one] and believe you dispense legal advice despite title . . . and,
therefore, in my view, I’m a GC of a company; if one of my lawyers
screws up, I’m responsible. I can’t say that’s a lawyer in compliance and
I get a “bye” . . . I think that is functionally wrong . . . .154

In both of these contexts, the consumer is a commercial entity that is
fairly savvy and represented by other counsel. Therefore, the risk of
information asymmetry is not as great as in noncorporate contexts. But a
different risk exists: a lawyer acting as a nonlawyer may actually have just
enough information, training, power and what Robert Rosen, Christine
Parker, and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen call “the lawyer cast of mind,”155 to
do more bad than good. As Dana Remus points out, “Corporate actors can
manipulate the coverage of the professional rules to their advantage, relying
on lawyers in different roles for different purposes. In this way, they can
manage risk and liability and access legal expertise subject to as few
constraints as possible.”156 Thus, lawyers can be used strategically to help
151. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
152. Beardslee, supra note 7, at 797 n.358.
153. Remus, supra note 8, at 1264–65 (making a similar point about consumer
confusion).
154. Anonymous Telephone Interview with General Counsel (Apr. 19, 2010).
155. Robert Eli Rosen, Christine E. Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, The Framing
Effects of Professionalism: Is There a Lawyer Cast of Mind? Lessons from Compliance
Programs, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 297 (2012).
156. Remus, supra note 8, at 1269–70 (“The proliferation of quasi-legal roles allows
corporate management to expand its strategic access to legal expertise under a greater range
of conditions and subject to fewer constraints. For example, management could hire a
licensed but nonpracticing lawyer to serve as a compliance officer.”).
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corporations pursue risky actions that are arguably legal but not within the
spirit of the law, or worse, to aid corporate misconduct.157 This risk has
been identified as one that exists even when lawyers are held to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct,158 therefore they are magnified here.
Thus, the compliance officer and claim funding roles may lead to a whole
new area of consultancy and quasi-legal work that lawyers (as opposed to
others) are more qualified and better situated to fill. If the purpose of UPL
laws is to further the monopoly of lawyers as legal service providers, then
there is clearly not a problem. If the purpose of UPL laws is to protect the
public, then, counterintuitively, despite the fact that these compliance
officers and claim funders were trained as lawyers, there might be a
problem. There is a risk to the public and to the reputation of lawyers as a
profession, because these ex-lawyers, now law consultants, may not
consider themselves bound by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and part of the profession.159 If that is the case, these legally trained
compliance and claim funding professionals may pose more of a risk than
nonlawyers to the public interest.160
CONCLUSION
Whether UPL statutes should exist, and if so in what form, is a
continuing debate. Given that the functions and services of lawyers have
grown, coupled with the broad definition of law practice under UPL
statutes, this debate matters. There appears to be a consensus, however, that
eliminating UPL restrictions will, if not defeat, at least detract from
lawyers’ monopoly of legal and/or law-related services. This Article
questions this consensus as it relates to the areas that straddle the line
between business and law.
In the corporate context, many new types of law-related services
provided by lawyers and nonlawyers challenge our understanding of what
constitutes the practice of law, as well as the appropriate boundaries of UPL
statutes. By exploring compliance and claim funding, two areas ripe for the
UPL statute debate, I attempt to determine whether the services provided by
lawyers and nonlawyers in these areas are considered the practice of law
under a more traditional lens. Based on seventy interviews with general
counsels and chief compliance officers and my own consultancy work for a
claim funding start-up, I believe that the answer is yes—the work
157. See DeStefano, supra note 12, at 83 (making a similar point).
158. See id.
159. This would be true if they clearly communicate to their clients that this is a lawrelated service that does not confer the benefits of the lawyer-client relationship. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2013); Remus, supra note 8, at 1261–62; Rostain, supra
note 16, at 1399. See generally CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE
SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY (2002) (examining effective strategies for corporate
self-regulation).
160. DeStefano, supra note 12, at 86 (making a similar point that corporate separation of
the compliance gatekeeping function from the legal department may harm the public
interest). This leads to an interesting question: can someone trained as a lawyer, that is, not
practicing law or presenting himself or herself as the client’s lawyer, violate UPL statutes?
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conducted by both compliance officers and claim funders would be
considered the practice of law, even under a narrower definition of law
practice than is adopted by many UPL statutes. Although neither job
requires a law degree, compliance officers and claim funders alike interpret
law, assess legal risks and strategies, and provide advice around litigation or
regulations.
Further, my research (along with secondary sources)
demonstrates that compliance officers and claim funders are often lawyers,
and having the experience and training of a lawyer may help them better
perform in their jobs.
Thus, contrary to the common lore that abolishing UPL statutes will
decrease lawyers’ monopoly on legal and law-related services, I
hypothesize that, in the corporate context, this may not be true—and the
opposite may even occur. I posit that because of their training and
experience, lawyers are better qualified to fill these mixed business-law
consultant jobs. Further, these areas that straddle the border between
business and law may help increase lawyers’ monopoly on law-related
services—if lawyers take advantage of the opportunity. For example, law
schools (usually run by lawyers) could offer certificates and other types of
training for these types of services. And law firms could offer ancillary
consulting services in these areas. Lastly, and perhaps counterintuitively, I
hypothesize that problems associated with unauthorized legal practice
might be exacerbated because legally trained lawyers might be able to use
their legal training to disadvantage the public in a way that is not regulated
by the profession and does not carry the threat of UPL allegations.
Ironically, it may be to the public’s benefit to consider these areas that are
on the margins as the practice of law, because then only lawyers bound by
the rules governing professional conduct could provide the service.
The point of this Article, however, is not to prove the impact of
abolishing UPL prohibitions. Indeed, I examine only two areas of law and
with limited research. Instead, the purpose is to add another layer to the
debate over whether to abolish or how to revise UPL prohibitions.
Although eliminating UPL statutes should logically lead to a decrease in
lawyers’ monopoly on legal and law-related services, as a famous fabulist
once said, things are “not always exactly what they seem.”161
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